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Contracts, Constitutions, and Getting the Interpretation-Construction
Distinction Right
Gregory Klass1
May 2019
18 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming 2020)

The interpretation-construction distinction is back. Contract scholars
have long recognized the difference between deciding what words mean,
or “interpretation,” and determining their legal effect, “construction.” But in
the last decade constitutional scholars have begun to attend to the
difference as well. “New Originalists” like Randy Barnett, Jack Balkin, and
Larry Solum have deployed the distinction to divide constitutional questions
into two broad categories.2 The first comprises questions that originalist
interpretation can answer. These include easy questions, like how old a
person must be to serve as President—“the Age of thirty five Years”3—and
perhaps also harder ones, such as the scope of “the right of the People to
keep and bear arms.”4 In the second category are questions that the text’s
original meaning does not answer, such as the reach of vague constitutional
terms such as “freedom of speech” or “due process of law.”5 The latter
category of questions occupy a “construction zone,” a region where
interpretive rules and original meaning must be supplemented with other
legal rules or principles to determine what the Constitution requires.6
To those of us who find the distinction between interpretation and
construction helpful, the new attention from constitutional theorists is
exciting. Contract scholars who have discussed the difference between
interpretation and construction never claimed it applied only to the law of
contracts. In fact, the concepts first appeared in Francis Lieber’s more
1

Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center. I am grateful from the questions and feedback I
received from Jud Campbell, John Mikhail and Larry Solum, and other
participants at the 2018 Salmon P. Chase Faculty Colloquium & Lecture,
Center for the Constitution, at Georgetown University Law Center.
2
See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,
27 Const. Comment. 95 (2010); Randy Barnett, Interpretation and
Construction, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 65 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, The
New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 641 (2013).
3
U.S. Const. art. II sect. 1.
4
U.S. Const. amend. II.
5
U.S. Const. amend. I & V.
6
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 2 at 108.
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general 1839 work, Legal and Political Hermeneutics—which barely
touches on contract law.7 So it is good to see the ideas being taken up by
scholars elsewhere.
At the same time, the new champions of the distinction have taken
it in directions a contracts scholar might find surprising. The idea of a
construction zone is not native to contract law, and it is not clear that it
makes sense there. And though textualism about contracts has had many
champions, few would claim that parties’ contractual obligations can ever
be determined only by interpreting their words—that there is something like
an interpretation zone. No matter how clear and unambiguous the parties’
language, a court will not enforce an agreement that is unconscionable,
against public policy, the result of fraud, mistake or duress, or in which a
party lacked capacity. When the New Originalists divide constitutional
questions between a zone of interpretation and a zone of construction they
are doing something new and different with the distinction.
This Article examines the interpretation-construction distinction
from the perspective of contract law. I make four claims about the activities
of interpretation and construction and the relationship between them. First,
construction happens not only when interpretation runs out, but is always
necessary to determine a text or other meaningful act’s legal effect.
Construction does not supplement interpretation, but complements it.
Second, there are multiple forms of interpretation and multiple types of
meaning. What meaning a text or other speech act has depends on what
questions one asks about it. Third, which type of meaning is legally relevant
depends on the applicable rule of construction. Rules of construction are in
the law conceptually prior to rules of interpretation. Finally, because a
single text can have multiple types of meaning, when interpretation of one
type runs out, interpretation of another might step in. Whether that is so
again depends on the applicable rule of construction.
Although I make the case for these four claims with reference to the
law of contract, I believe that they apply to legal exegesis generally. In this
Article, I use the occasion of the Georgetown Center for the Constitution’s
2018 Salmon P. Chase Faculty Colloquium, which commemorated the
150th anniversary of the publication of Thomas Cooley’s Treatise on
Constitutional Limitations, to argue that the above claims about
interpretation and construction illuminate Cooley’s, and before him Joseph
Story’s, theories of constitutional interpretation. Neither Cooley nor Story
relies on the distinction between interpretation and construction. But each
recognizes the existence of multiple types of meaning a constitutional text
might have, each appeals to political principles to argue that the public
meaning of the text at the time of ratification should control, and each
7

Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of
Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics (enlarged ed.
1839/1970) (hereinafter “Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics”).
2

Contracts and Constitutions
recognizes that once one form of interpretation runs out, another might step
in. Their theories therefore reflect both the difference between the activities
of interpretation and construction, and a correct understanding of the
relationship between them.
Part One provides basic definitions “interpretation” and
“construction,” the two activities that together comprise legal exegesis. Part
Two uses the example of contract law to analyze the activities of
interpretation and construction and the relationship between them. Part
Three argues that the account of interpretation and construction developed
in Part Two illuminates Joseph Story’s and Thomas Cooley’s constitutional
theories. Without attempting to provide an exhaustive account of Story’s
and Cooley’s approaches to constitutional exegesis, I argue that key moves
in their shared analyses exemplify the relationship between interpretation
and construction described in Part Two. Part Four briefly discusses the
appearance of an analog to Lawrence Solum’s fixation thesis in Cooley’s
treatise, and differences between the Solum’s and Cooley’s arguments for
that claim.
1

Basic Concepts

As I will use the terms, the activity of interpretation identifies the
meaning of a legal actor’s words or actions; the activity of construction their
legal effect. Rules of interpretation tell us how to discern the meaning of
what legal actors say and do; rules of construction tell us how determine
the resulting legal state of affairs.
Rules of interpretation and rules of construction are different in
kind. Interpretation—attributing meaning to words and actions—is
something we do both inside and outside the law, and legal interpretation
draws on meanings that originate outside it. The law does not speak its own
language. Although there exist legal terms of art—“mens rea,” “strict
scrutiny,” “unconscionability”—legal speakers mostly use words in their
everyday meanings—“vehicles,” “in,” “park.” When interpreting legal texts,
Webster’s is generally at least as useful as is Black’s. This is not to say that
the activity of legal interpretation is identical to interpretation of other
types. In addition to attending to legal terms of art, legal interpretation is
often governed by special rules, such as restrictions on the evidence the
interpreter may consider. But the activity of legal interpretation—assigning
meaning to legal actors’ words and actions—is continuous with our
everyday interpretive practices. The rules that give meaning to what legal
actors say and do originate by and large outside the law.
Construction, in distinction, is a purely legal activity. Rules of
construction are components of what H.L.A. Hart calls “secondary rules,”
rules that “provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain things
introduce new [legal rules], extinguish or modify old ones, or in various

3
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ways determine their incidence or control.”8 If a public official’s or private
person’s words effect a change in the legal landscape, it is not solely
because of what those words mean. It is also because there is a legal rule
that gives that person the power to effect the legal change in that way.9
Such rules include sub-rules of the form: When person P does or says x, the
legal result is y. Those rules are, in the sense I use the term, rules of
construction; they determine the legal effect of authorized speech acts.
Whereas rules of interpretation originate outside the law, rules of
construction are creatures of law. Rules of construction govern when and
how a person’s words or actions effect a legal change.
In this Article, I follow Lieber and use “exegesis” to refer to the
practice of interpretation and construction together.10 Legal exegesis is the
process of determining the legal effect of a legal actor’s words or actions.
Often, though not always, legal exegesis involves both interpretation and
construction.11 A theoretical account of legal exegesis therefore requires an
account of both legal activities and the relationship between them.
This Article does not provide a complete theory of legal exegesis.
My goal is to identify a few salient and often overlooked aspects of the
relationship between its two components, interpretation and construction,
using as illustrations first contract law and then two nineteenth century
accounts of constitutional interpretation.
2

Interpretation and Construction in Contract Law

It is easy to see the difference between interpretation and
construction in the law of contracts. Because contractual obligations are
chosen obligations, they depend in large part on the parties’ intent.
Identifying the parties’ intent requires interpreting their words and actions.
Thus one commonly finds in contract decisions, at the beginning of the
court’s legal analysis, an affirmation that “[t]he primary goal in interpreting
contracts is to determine and enforce the parties’ intent.”12 Because
8

H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 81 (2d ed. 1994).
Hart calls this category of secondary rules “rules of change.” Id. at 95-96.
10
Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 64.
11
Not always because the construction of a legal formality, such as the
private seal, does not require interpretation of its meaning. The use of the
formality suffices to effect the legal change. That said, many legal
formalities also include defenses, such as mistake, that call for
interpretation of the parties’ beliefs and intentions. The legal effect of such
formalities is to create a presumptive legal change, which might be
defeated by interpretation of what the particular use of the formality meant
in context.
12
Old Kent Bank v. Sobczak, 243 Mich. App. 57, 63 (2000). A few other
examples: “The fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is
9
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contractual obligations are chosen obligations, their identification requires
interpretation of parties’ acts of choice.
But contractual obligations are not only a matter of party choice,
and even when party choice controls there are rules governing how courts
identify it. Examples are manifold. Sometimes when parties enter into a
binding agreement, they do not have or do not express an intent one way or
another on a matter—say whether the seller warrants the quality of the
goods or what the remedy for breach will be. Thus the importance of
default terms—rules that determine parties’ contractual obligation in the
absence of evidence or expression of their contrary intent. Or the parties’
expressions of intent might be ambiguous. When this occurs, a court might
apply a rule like contra proferentem, interpreting against the drafter, or the
preference for interpretations in the public interest, neither of which
requires further interpretation of the parties’ words or actions. There are
also cases in which the parties’ intent is clear, but a court will decline to
give it legal effect. This is so, for example, when the parties’ agreement runs
contrary to a mandatory rule, such as a minimum wage or civil rights law,
the penalty rule for liquidated damages, or the generic prohibition on
enforcing agreements against public policy. Courts also apply interpretive
rules that predictably sometimes fail to capture the parties’ intent. Plain
meaning rules, for example, exclude context evidence that can be essential
for understanding how the parties reasonably understood their own words.
Thus a recent defense of plain meaning interpretation begins with the thesis
that sophisticated repeat players care less about interpretive accuracy than
they do about predictability and reduced costs of interpretation.13 Finally,
the words “the parties’ intent” are themselves ambiguous. Do they refer, for
example, to parties’ intent with respect to their legal obligations? Or do they
refer only to their intended exchange, from which those legal obligations
flow? Is it their actual, subjective intent? Or is it their objective intent—what
a reasonable person in their situation would understand their intent to be?
All this suggests that courts do much more than merely interpret contracting
parties’ words and actions. They apply rules of construction to determine
those words and actions’ legal effects.
that agreements are construed in accord with the parties’ intent.” Greenfield
v. Philles Records, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569 (2002). “Under statutory rules
of contract interpretation, the mutual intention of the parties at the time the
contract is formed governs interpretation.” AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
51 Cal. 3d 807, 821 (1990) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1636). “The cardinal
rule for interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties
and to give effect to that intention, consistent with legal principles.” Bob
Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578,
580 (Tenn. 1975).
13
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541 (2003).
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This Article’s working hypothesis is that exploring the interplay
between interpretation and construction in contract law illuminates how
those activities function elsewhere in the law. This Part identifies four
structural features of legal exegesis, each of which is readily apparent in the
law of contract. My claim—which I do not fully defend, but begin to
explore in the Part Three—is that these features are general ones. Although
rules of legal exegesis differ across various domains of law, these four
features hold constant. Part Three argues that attending to them casts new
light on Joseph Story and Thomas Cooley’s theories of constitutional
exegesis.
2.1

Construction does not supplement interpretation, but complements it

Francis Lieber, who introduced the interpretation-construction
distinction in his 1839 book Legal and Political Hermeneutics, employs
what I will call a “supplemental” conception of the activities of
interpretation and construction. On Lieber’s conception, interpretation
alone sometimes suffices to determine a text’s legal effect; construction is
necessary only when interpretation either runs out or runs up against a
higher-order rule. “[W]e have to settle whether in the given case,
interpretation suffices, or whether we must have recourse to construction.”14
In the course of Legal and Political Hermeneutics, Lieber identifies three
circumstances in which interpretation might not fully determine a text’s
legal effect—situations in which “interpretation ceases to avail.”15 The first
is when the text’s meaning is unclear, for example because it contains
internal contradictions.16 The second is when the lawgiver did not foresee
certain cases, and therefore failed to provide for them.17 The third occurs
14

Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 62.
Id. at 55.
16
Id. at 55-56. Today theorists would more likely emphasize ambiguities.
Lieber, for reasons internal to his theory of meaning, holds that legal texts
are never truly ambiguous. Id. at 86.
17
Id. at 56 (“Construction is likewise our guide, if we are bound to act in
cases which have not been foreseen by framers of those rules, by which we
are nevertheless obliged, for some binding reason, faithfully to regulate, as
well as we can, our actions respecting the unforeseen case.”), 57 (“In
politics, construction signifies generally the supplying of supposed or real
imperfections, or insufficiencies of a text, according to proper principles
and rules. By insufficiency, we understand, both imperfect provision for the
cases, which might or ought to have been provided for, and the
inadequateness of the text for cases which human wisdom could not
foresee.”), 121 (“Construction is unavoidable. Men who use words, even
with the best intent and great care as well as skill, cannot foresee all
possible complex cases, and if they could, they would be unable to provide
15
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when the text’s meaning contravenes “more general and binding rules,
[such as] constitutional, written and solemnly acknowledged rules, or moral
ones, written in the heart of every man.”18 In each of these situations,
interpretation alone does not tell us what the law is. It must be
supplemented by the activity of construction. In all other circumstances,
interpretation suffices. The text’s legal effect corresponds to its meaning,
and the text’s interpretation tells us what the law is.
Lieber’s supplemental conception might be traced to his focus on
public law—statutes and constitutions, as distinguished from contracts,
deeds and other private legal documents—together with an implicit
adherence to the command theory of law.19 The point of a command
relationship is to give the commander the power to choose, within the
scope of her command authority, what the recipient shall be required to do.
When interpreting the commander’s words, the recipient’s job is therefore
to discern the commander’s choice, to seek out the intent behind those
words. “When I say, ‘Jump,’ you say ‘How high?’”20 This is precisely how
Lieber understands the activity of interpretation. “Interpretation is the art of
finding out the . . . sense which their author intended to convey, and of
enabling others to derive from them the very same idea which the author
intended to convey.”21 When the sovereign’s words clearly express her
intent, we know the content of her command, and “interpretation suffices.”
Non-interpretive rules of construction appear only when either the
sovereign’s words do not express her intent or that intent contravenes a
higher-order law or principle.
Lieber’s supplemental conception of interpretation and construction
is a poor fit for the law of contract. Contracts are not commands. And
although contracting parties enjoy a something like the power to make law
for themselves, it would be odd to call the private persons who enter into
contracts “sovereigns.” It is not the parties’ intent that makes the legal
obligation. It is the law of contract, which attaches legal consequences to
their exchange agreement, sometimes in the absence of an expressed intent
for them, for each complex case would require its own provision and
rule.”).
18
Id. at 166. See also id. at 115 (“But it is not said that interpretation is all
that shall guide us, and . . . there are considerations, which ought to induce
us to abandon interpretation, or with other words to sacrifice the direct
meaning of a text to considerations still weightier; especially not to
slaughter justice, the sovereign object of laws, to the law itself, the means of
obtaining it.”).
19
See Hart, supra note 8 at 18-25 (describing the command theory); H.L.A.
Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on
Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 243 (1982).
20
See, e.g., Universal Soldier (Studio Canal, 1992).
21
Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 23.
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to contract and sometimes despite their expressed intent.22 As the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire observed as far back as 1926, “A
contract is not a law, nor does it make law. ‘It is the agreement plus the law
that makes the ordinary contract an enforceable obligation.’”23 The power
to contract exists only because and only insofar positive law grants it to
persons. Interpretation of the parties’ intent never suffices to identify their
legal obligations.
In the 1951 first edition of his contract treatise, Arthur Linton Corbin
reconceptualized the interpretation-construction distinction in a way that
better describes contract exegesis.
By “interpretation of language” we determine what ideas that
language induces in other persons. By “construction of the
contract,” as the term will be used here, we determine its legal
operation—its effect upon the action of courts and administrative
officials. If we make this distinction, then the construction of a
contract starts with the interpretation of its language but does not
end with it; while the process of interpretation stops wholly short of
a determination of the legal relations of the parties.24
22

For more on this idea, see the discussion of contract law’s duty-imposing
aspect in Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and
Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726 (2008).
23
Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 133 A. 4, 6 (N.H. 1926) (quoting Stanley
v. Kimball, 118 A. 636, 637 (N.H. 1922)). See also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v.
Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 130, 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1164,
113 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1991) (“A contract has no legal force apart from the law
that acknowledges its binding character.”); Groves v. John Wunder Co.,
286 N.W. 235, 239-40 (Minn. 1939) (Olson, J., dissenting) (The “obligation
of the contract does not inhere or subsist in the agreement itself proprio
vigore, but in the law applicable to the agreement, that is, in the act of the
law in binding the promisor to perform his promise. When it is said that one
who enters upon an undertaking assumes the legal duties relating to it, what
is really meant is that the law imposes the duties on him. A contract is not a
law, nor does it make law. It is the agreement plus the law that makes the
ordinary contract an enforceable obligation.” (quoting 12 Am. Jur.,
Contracts, § 2.).
24
Arthur Linton Corbin, 3 Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise
on the Rules of Contract Law § 534, 7 (1951) (hereinafter “Corbin (1st
edition)”). Those interested in the development of Corbin’s thoughts on the
interpretation-construction distinction should begin with a passage he
added on the subject as editor the 1919 third American edition of Anson’s
Principles of the Law of Contracts. William Reynell Anson, Principles of the
Law of Contract: With a Chapter on the Law of Agency, 14th English ed.,
3rd American ed. § 353, 405-06 (Arthur L. Corbin ed. 1919) (reprinted in
8
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Whereas Lieber describes construction as supplementing interpretation,
Corbin conceives of construction more generally as the activity of
determining the legal consequences of contracting parties’ words and
actions.25 Determining those consequences might require interpretation. But
interpretation alone tells us only what some persons said, meant or
intended: “the process of interpretation stops wholly sort of a determination
of the legal relations of the parties.” We require a rule of construction to
determine which sayings or meanings or intendings of what legal actors
have what legal effects. On Corbin’s picture, construction does not
supplement interpretation but complements it. Construction does not begin
when interpretation ends, for the parties’ contractual obligations always
depend on a rule of construction, even when that rule provides that their
contractual obligations are the ones they intended.26
Although this point is perhaps especially obvious when it comes to
the law of contracts, it applies to legal exegesis generally. Recall Hart’s
argument that law is more than the sovereign’s command backed by the
Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 Yale L.J. 739, 74041 (1919)).
25
Corbin expressly rejects Lieber’s account of interpretation and
construction. 3 Corbin (1st edition) § 534, 11, n.11.
26
If one looks, one finds the seeds of this complementary conception in
Lieber. There is a difference in kind between a text that does not answer a
legal question because it is internally contradictory, ambiguous or contains
gaps, and one whose definite meaning contravenes a higher-order rule.
Lieber recognizes cases of the latter type, which suggest that rules of
construction always lurk in the background, as they reflect limits on the
sovereign’s authority. Thus near the end a chapter on construction, Lieber
writes:
We have seen that interpretation means nothing more than finding
out the true sense and meaning. But it is not said that interpretation
is all that shall guide us, and . . . there are considerations, which
ought to induce us to abandon interpretation, or with other words to
sacrifice the direct meaning of a text to considerations still
weightier; especially not to slaughter justice, the sovereign object of
laws, to the law itself, the means of obtaining it. In this respect,
interpretation is much like political economy, a highly useful
science, yet, withal, its object is to ascertain the laws which regulate
the physical existence of society, and there are subjects superior to
this.
Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 115. Whereas my argument is a
conceptual one, Lieber’s explanation sounds in the register of political
morality. It might be summarized—appropriately, given this colloquium’s
venue—as: Law is but the means, justice is the end.
9
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threat of force. A mature legal system includes rules of recognition, which
specify “the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and
adjudication” and “must be effectively accepted as common public
standards of official behavior by its officials.”27 In a mature legal system
such as ours, the command of the sovereign is law only because it satisfies
an accepted rule of recognition. It is a rule of recognition that gives the
sovereign the power to issue new laws and specifies how she can exercise
that power. Rules of recognition, in turn, include rules of construction—
rules that specify how the sovereign’s words and actions can effect a legal
change. If one follows Hart on this point, the complementary conception of
interpretation and construction is a general one.
Although the idea can be obscured by his emphasis on the
“construction zone,” Lawrence Solum also advocates a complementary
conception of constitutional interpretation and construction. Solum calls
this the “Two Moments Model.”
In some cases, judges may attend only to interpretation (because
construction seems obvious and intuitive). In other cases, judges
may focus entirely on construction; this is especially likely when an
area of constitutional law involves a provision that is highly vague
and abstract, or when case law provides a thick and complex body
of constitutional doctrines. In the former cases, construction may be
tacit and unconscious, while in the latter cases, interpretation may
be invisible.28
That said, because he is an originalist, Solum emphasizes Lieber’s ordering:
interpretation first, construction second. In the discussion that follows, I
focus on how relevant rules of construction determine what counts as the
correct approach to interpretation—ways in which rules of construction,
which call for legal and political justifications rather than philosophicallinguistic ones, precede and structure legal interpretation.
2.2

There are multiple meanings of “meaning,” which correspond to
multiple types of interpretation

Although Lieber and Corbin have different understandings of the
relationship between interpretation and construction, each has a relatively
narrow conception of meaning. For Lieber, “[t]rue sense is . . . the meaning
which the person or persons, who made use of the words, intended to
27

Hart, supra note 8 at 116.
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82
Fordham L. Rev. 453, 499 (2013). See also id. at 481-82. What I am calling
the “supplemental conception” is something like what Solum calls the
“Alternative Methods Model.” Id. at 498.
28
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convey to others, whether he used them correctly, skillfully, logically or
not.”29 Corbin employs a more listener-centered account of meaning, but
one that is similarly unequivocal. “By ‘interpretation of language’ we
determine what ideas that language induces in other persons.”30 Although
their conceptions differ, both Lieber and Corbin assume that meaning is a
simple concept—and accordingly that interpretation is always the same
activity.
Contemporary theories of language reject such assumptions. Since
at least the early twentieth century, language theorists have differentiated
multiple types of meaning that a single speech act—a text, utterance, or
other communicative act—can have. J.L. Austin, for example, distinguished
between a speech act’s locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary
forces—roughly what the speaker’s words literally mean, what the speaker
intends to say with them, and what the speaker intends to accomplish by so
saying.31 And today linguists commonly differentiate between a speech act’s
pragmatic meaning—the best interpretation of the speaker’s communicative
intentions—and its semantic meaning—its conventional meaning, which
can be identified independently of the speaker’s apparent intentions.32
Behind the suggestion that there are multiple types of meaning is the
idea that meaning is not something just out there, waiting to be
discovered—in the way, say, water on Mars might be. Meaning is the
product of interpretive practices—in the first instance the interpretive
practices of members of the linguistic community in which a speech act
occurs, and sometimes also the interpretive practices of persons outside that
community.33 This is not to deny that a speech act’s meaning is a fact about
the world, or that there are better or worse interpretations of it. But its
meaning is a social fact, one whose existence depends on the relevant
29

Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 23. See also id. at 19 (“[I]t is
necessary for him, for whose benefit [a sign] is intended, to find out, what
those persons who use the sign, intend to convey to the mind of the
beholder or hearer.”).
30
3 Corbin (1st edition) § 534, 7.
31
J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 94-108 (1962).
32
These definitions, which I think are the most productive for legal
applications, oversimplify. Robyn Carston identifies five separate ways
scholars have tried to draw the distinction between pragmatic meaning and
semantic meaning. Robyn Carston, Linguistic Communication and the
Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction, 165 Synthese 321, 322 (2008). And the
topic is rich enough to the subject of at least one doctoral dissertation.
Börjesson, Kristin. The Semantics-Pragmatics Controversy (2014). See also
Kent Bach, The Semantics/Pragmatic Distinction: What It Is and Why It
Matters, Linguistische Berichte, Sonderheft 8, 33 (1997).
33
On the last point, think about the meanings a group of experimental
psychologists might assign to the words of children they are observing.
11
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social interpretive practices. And because there are multiple, sometimes
overlapping social interpretive practices, there are multiple, sometimes
overlapping types of meaning. Which interpretive practice we deploy in
given situation—what type of meaning we care about—depends on the
goal of the inquiry.
Although Corbin employs a simple theory of meaning, contract law
too distinguishes among multiple types of meaning. The relevant questions
can, without too much violence to the phenomena, be grouped under three
headings: Whose meaning governs? What type of meaning governs? And
what facts determine that meaning?
Whose meaning governs? Contracts are generated by the
communications of two or more parties, sometimes directed towards
potential third-party enforcers. Because different people can attach different
meanings to the same words or actions, contract disputes sometimes raise
the question of whose meaning is legally relevant.
Various answers have been given.34 To begin with a somewhat
obscure example, in the 1890 first edition of his contracts treatise Joseph
Chitty recommends William Paley’s rule for promises: contractual
obligations should turn on the speaker’s understanding of how the hearer
understood her. “Where the terms of promise admit of more senses than
one, the promise is to be performed in that sense in which the promiser
apprehended, at the time, that the promisee received it.”35 Another, more
familiar answer to the “whose meaning” question is the strong version of
the so-called objective theory. According to that rule, the meaning of
neither party controls, but the objectively reasonable understanding of their
words in the circumstances in which those words were used. Thus Learned
Hand famously opined:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached
by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words,
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If,
34

Calamari and Perillo, for example, identify six possible answers to the
question “whose meaning is to be given to an agreement.” John D.
Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and
Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 Ind. L.J. 333, 345-46 (1967). Their
list is incomplete, as it does not include Chitty’s suggestion, discussed in
this paragraph.
35
Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts and upon the Defences
to Actions Thereon, 12th Ed. 127 (1890) (quoting William Paley, The
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy 58 (1819)). For a contemporary
criticism, see Fredrik Pollock, Principles of Contract: A Treatise on the
General Principles Concerning the Validity of Agreements in the Law of
England, 5th Edition 235 (1889).
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however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when
he used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning
which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless
there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.36
The Second Restatement adopts a third option and mixed rule.
Oversimplifying a bit, when the parties’ subjective meanings converge—
when they have the same actual understandings of the agreement—those
subjective meanings govern; when the parties attach different subjective
meanings to their words and actions, the words’ objective meaning
governs.37 Under this rule, contract interpretation should in principle begin
by looking to the parties’ actual, or subjective, understandings, and look to
objective meaning only when there is a subjective disagreement.38
There is occasionally a second variety of question under the “whose
meaning” heading. Parties sometimes agree to writings that they have not
themselves authored. In so-called contracts of adhesion, one party drafts a
written agreement that it gives to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In
other contractual agreements, the parties use an off-the-rack form contract
drafted by an industry association or purchased from a commercial source.
In either type of transaction, one might distinguish between the author of
the agreement and its authorizer, again raising the question of whose
understanding should control.
Although it is rarely put this way, the possible gap between the
author of a contractual agreement and the parties who authorize it raises
interesting questions. Because contracts are first and foremost private
transactions, authorizer meaning—the meaning the parties’ attach to their
words—is generally speaking more salient than author meaning. But the
contra proferentem rule provides that an ambiguous agreement will be
interpreted against the drafting party. Thus when only one party authors the
agreement, courts sometimes discount its understanding, even though it is
also an authorizer. Alternatively, when an industry association or other
public entity has drafted the agreement, it might make sense to give weight
to author understanding, even at the expense of the understanding of one or
both authorizing parties.39 As compared to the parties, the industry

36

Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(1) (1981). For a detailed
account, see Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 353 (2007).
38
In practice, determining the objective meaning of the parties’ words and
actions pretty much always suffices to decide a controversy, so courts start
there.
39
For an example, see Town Bank v. City Real Estate Dev., LLC, 793
N.W.2d 476, 490-93 (Wis. 2010) (repeating arguments in an amicus brief
37
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association that wrote the agreement is likely to have a greater interest in
and insight into the effects of one or another interpretation on future users
of it. Insofar as the court’s reading of the standard contract’s words are
likely to be applied to future parties,40 the industry association’s
understanding of its meaning might generate the best outcome.
What type of meaning governs? Whereas the “whose meaning”
question has long been front and center in contract law, less attention has
been paid to the different types of meaning a contractual agreement can
have. Contract theorists have yet to integrate late twentieth-century lessons
from the philosophy of language into their accounts of contract exegesis.41
One issue under the “what type of meaning” heading is familiar: the
existence of local dialects, in contract law often termed “usages of trade.”42
Courts have long recognized that words can have local conventional
meanings, especially within merchant communities. Thus Williston,
following Wigmore, distinguishes between the “popular standard, meaning
the common and normal sense of words,” and “the local standard,
including the special usages of a religious sect, a body of traders, and alien
population, or a local dialect.”43 The Second Restatement provides that
when both parties know or should be aware of a local standard—for
example, when both are members of the same merchant community—the

by the Wisconsin Bankers Association, which had drafted the loan
agreement at issue in the case).
40
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(2) (1981) (a standardized
writing “is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of
the standard terms of the writing”).
41
An important exception was Peter Tiersma. See, e.g., Peter Tiesma, The
Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of
Intent, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 189 (1986); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reassessing
Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1 (1992); Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 Rutgers
L. Rev. 1 (1995).
42
“Usages of trade” is used to refer both to specialized meanings that words
might have among a group of merchants and to the typical practices of
those merchants. The former usages are relevant to interpretation. The latter
provide gap fillers, or defaults—which are rules of construction. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 220 & 221 (1981) (providing
respectively rules for “Usage Relevant to Interpretation” and “Usage
Supplementing an Agreement”).
43
Samuel Williston, 2 The Law of Contracts § 604, 1162 (1920) (hereinafter
“Williston (1st edition)”) (quoting John Henry Wigmore, 4 A Treatise on the
Anglo-American Law of Evidence at Trials at Common Law, § 2641, 3474
(1905)).
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words of their agreement are interpreted in accordance with it.44 Thus if
among rabbit dealers, the word “thousand” is commonly used to refer to
one-hundred dozen, a contract between merchants to sell rabbits at “60£
per thousand” will be read to specify a price of sixty pounds per twelvehundred rabbits.45 As between the popular conventional meaning and a
local conventional meaning, courts will interpret their words in accordance
with the latter so long as both parties are members of the relevant linguistic
community.
A subtler and less theorized question is the choice between
semantic and pragmatic meaning. Should the parties’ words be interpreted
in accordance with their literal, or conventional, meanings in some
language (popular or local), or should they be interpreted in light of one or
both parties’ actual or apparent communicative intentions. When
sophisticated parties write out the terms of their agreement, they often
invest considerable resources ensure that their words conventional
meanings correspond to their intended agreement. Such agreements are
unlikely to include figures of speech in which the intended meaning is a
nonliteral one. But in other contractual agreements one finds gaps between
the pragmatic and semantic meanings of the parties’ words and actions.
Joking offers are examples.46 So is sales talk.47
An example that falls into neither of those familiar categories can be
found in the casebook staple, Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods
Co. Here a Missouri appellate court considered the correct interpretation of
the words, “Go ahead, you’re all right; get your men out and don’t let that
worry you,” spoken by the company’s president, McKittrick, to an
employee, Embry, who was threatening to quit unless given a new
contract.48 At trial, the jury was instructed to find that there was a contract
only “if you (the jury) find both parties thereby intended and did contract
with each other for plaintiff's employment.”49 The appellate court held this
was an error. “[T]hough McKittrick may not have intended to employ
Embry by what transpired between them . . ., yet if what McKittrick said
would have been taken by a reasonable man to be an employment, and
Embry so understood it, it constituted a valid contract of employment.”50 In
short, the existence of a contract depended on the objective meaning of the
president’s statement, not on his subjective understanding of it. What
44

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 220 (1981).
Id. Ill. 8 (based on Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728 (K.B.1832)).
46
The two classic teaching cases for these rules are Lucy v. Zehmer, 84
S.E.2d 516 (1954), and Leonard v. Pepsico, 88 F.Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
47
E.g., UCC 2-313(2).
48
105 S.W. 777, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
49
Id. at 778.
50
Id. at 779.
45
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neither the trial nor the appellate court questioned, however, was that the
outcome did not turn on the literal meaning of the defendant’s words: “Go
ahead, you’re all right; get your men out and don’t let that worry you.”
What mattered was the communicative intent—subjective or objective—
behind them. Generally speaking, contract interpretation aims at pragmatic
meaning.
Even when courts take a highly textualist approach to the words in a
written agreement, they do not limit themselves to their semantic meaning.
Williston, who is commonly identified as a formalist on contract
interpretation, explained in the first edition of his treatise.
[I]n giving effect to the general meaning of a writing particular
words are sometimes wholly disregarded, or supplied. Thus “or”
may be given the meaning of “and,” or vice versa, if the remainder
of the agreement shows that a reasonable person in the position of
the parties would so understand it.51
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals, which takes a textualist approach
to contract interpretation, has recently affirmed that “[a] written contract
will be read as a whole, and every part will be interpreted with reference to
the whole; and if possible it will be so interpreted as to give effect to its
general purpose.”52 Although conventional meanings obviously figure into
contract interpretation, that interpretation typically seeks to identify more
than the semantic content of the parties’ words. It seeks out their pragmatic
meaning—the parties’ actual, apparent or probable intent in using them.
An older New York case, William C. Atwater & Co. v. Panama
Railroad Company, illustrates the salience of pragmatic meaning even to
highly textualist interpretation. At issue was an installment contract for the
sale of coal and the legal effect of a clause reading: “Any portion of the
tonnage remaining unshipped at the date of expiration of this agreement
shall be considered cancelled without notice.”53 The sentence’s literal, or
semantic, meaning was that both parties would be released from liability for
any coal unshipped by the end of the installment period. It was paired,
however, with a provision that permitted the seller to reduce installments
upon buyer breach. After the buyer refused to accept shipments and the
seller exercised its option to halt deliveries, the buyer attempted to avoid all
liability for undelivered shipments by invoking the above clause. Read
literally, the provision excused the buyer from liability. But reading the
agreement as a whole, and in light of the seller’s contractual option to
reduce installments after buyer breach, the Court of Appeals concluded that
51

2 Williston (1st edition) § 619, 1199.
Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Entech, Inc., 100 N.Y.2d 352, 358 (2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
53
159 N.E. 418 (N.Y. 1927).
52
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the clause’s purpose was to limit the seller’s liability upon exercise of the
option—and not to insulate the buyer from liability for losses resulting from
its own breach. “Reason, equity, fairness—all such lights on the probably
intention of the parties—show what the real agreement was.”54 The
apparent purpose of the contract term was legally controlling at the expense
of the words’ literal meaning. Although the literal, or semantic, meanings of
parties’ words are highly salient, the ultimate goal of contract interpretation
is usually to get at their pragmatic content—at the parties’ apparent or
actual intent in using them.
What facts determine the legally relevant meaning? A third question
is what types of evidence the interpreter may consider when determining
the meaning of the parties’ words and actions, in other words, what facts
determine the legally relevant meaning. This question too is a familiar one.
Contracts scholars often use New York and California as archetypes of the
different answers courts give to the “what facts” question.
As noted above, New York courts employ a textualist rule. It can be
found, for example, in the New York Court of Appeals’ opinion in W.W.W.
Associates, Inc. v. Giancontieri:
[W]hen parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete
document, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to
its terms. Evidence outside the four corners of the document as to
what was really intended but unstated or misstated is generally
inadmissible to add to or vary the writing.55
In New York, extrinsic evidence—evidence other than the text of the
agreement, the interpreter’s background understanding, and perhaps a
dictionary—may be introduced only if the writing itself is ambiguous or its
meaning is otherwise unclear. Moreover, whether the writing is ambiguous
is also to be determined from the text alone. “[E]xtrinsic and parol evidence
is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a written agreement which is
complete and clear and unambiguous upon its face.”56 Courts and scholars
commonly refer to the meaning that can be gleaned solely from the text of a
written agreement as its “plain meaning.”57

54

Id. at 419.
W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1990). See
also R/S Assocs. v. N.Y. Job Dev. Auth., 98 N.Y.2d 29, 32 (2002).
56
Id. at 163 (quoting Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d
372, 379 (1969)).
57
As the above discussion shows, plain meaning is a form of pragmatic
meaning. A written agreement’s plain meaning might not be its literal
meaning.
55
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California’s very different approach appears in Justice Traynor’s
classic opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging:
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the
meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the
court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the
offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the
language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.58
In other words, when considering a written agreement, the judge may
always look to extrinsic evidence to determine its possible meanings.
Interpretation aims not at the writing’s plain meaning, but at the meaning of
the words in it in light of the context in which they were used.
Although the New York and California rules are often characterized
as occupying two sides of a textualist-contextualist divide, the choice of
interpretive facts is not a binary one.59 Contract law distinguishes among
multiple types of interpretive inputs. In addition to the words or actions
whose meaning is at issue, the inputs can include the interpreter’s
familiarity with language and her background knowledge of the world;
dictionary definitions and rules of grammar; information about who the
parties are and the commercial setting of their transaction; evidence of local
linguistic practices and common terms of trade; other communications
among or by the parties, especially during negotiations; the parties’ prior
dealings with one another; and the course of the parties’ performance under
the contract. Any given rule of contract interpretation can permit more or
less evidence of meaning, depending on the types of evidence it authorizes
(it might admit, for example, evidence of usages of trade but not of course
of performance), on when that evidence is allowed in (always, only when
the plain meaning is ambiguous, only in informal or nonintegrated
communications, etc.), on who may consider the evidence (only the judge,
also the jury), and so forth. The question is not simply whether or not to
limit the interpretive evidence to the text and a dictionary, but how much
evidence of what type to allow under what circumstances, where the
possible answers include “None ever,” “All always,” and many points
between.
58

Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37 (1968).
I am not the first to make this point. See Henry E. Smith, The Language of
Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1157-66
(2003) (identifying ways that rules can be designed to achieve a “differential
formalism”); Avery Weiner Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in
Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 496, 515-19 (2004) (observing
several ways in which courts can permit more or less evidence in
interpretation).
59
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The interplay between the three questions. Although the above
questions—whose meaning, what type of meaning, and what evidence of
meaning—are logically distinct, there are obvious connections among their
answers. If contract interpretation were to aim only at literal meaning, for
example, the question of whose meaning would be answered and the most
relevant interpretive facts would be those found in dictionaries and
grammar books. If contract interpretation were to aim only at the parties’
subjective understanding of their agreement, the course of their
performance under it would be of greater evidentiary value than it would
be under a purely objective theory. And so forth.
That said, theorists risk confusion by running the different questions
together. Consider the common division of interpretive theories into
“textualist” and “purposivist” camps. Although the categories are
historically descriptive—1980s statutory textualism arose in response to the
purposivism of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks’s legal process theory60—they
answer different questions. The core claim of textualism is an evidentiary
one. To the “what evidence” question, it answers: Interpretation should
begin, and when possible end, with the text. Purposivism, in distinction, is
about the type of meaning: A legal text should interpret in light of its
apparent purpose, perhaps at the expense of its literal meaning. Although
some versions of purposivism—including Hart and Sacks’s61—recommend
looking to extratextual evidence of purpose, textualism is perfectly
compatible with the search for purpose. In fact, as I observed above,
textualist approaches to contract interpretation commonly also attend to
parties’ apparent purpose: the writing is to be “read as a whole to determine
its purpose and intent.”62
Another mistake is to equate the objective theory, which is about
whose meaning controls, with textualism, which is again about what facts
go into interpretation. In Empro Manufacturing v. Ball–Co Manufacturing,
Judge Easterbrook invokes the principle that “’intent’ in contract law is
objective rather than subjective,”63 to reach the conclusion that “intent must
be determined solely from the language used when no ambiguity in its
terms exists.”64 The one proposition does not follow from the other. It is true
that extrinsic evidence is especially probative of subjective intent. But the
60

See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 23-29 (2006).
61
See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1211-54 (W. Eskridge, Jr.,
& P. Frickey, eds. 1994) (discussing the use of legislative history).
62
Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d at 162.
63
870 F.2d 423, 425 (8th Cir. 1989). See also Skycom Corp. v. Telstar
Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814-17 (7th Cir. 1987).
64
Id. (quoting Schek v. Chicago Transit Authority, 42 Ill.2d 362, 364
(1969)).
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objective theory does not entail that an interpreter should limit herself to
the words on the page. When interpretation seeks out the understanding of
a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the parties, evidence of
context can be essential. The answer to the “whose meaning” question does
not determine the answer to the “what evidence” question.
2.3

Because legal interpretation serves construction, the applicable rule of
construction determines the correct rule of interpretation

This third structural feature follows fairly closely upon the second.
Because there are multiple types of meaning and interpretation, we require
a rule to determine which type is legally relevant—which meaning goes
into determining a speech act’s legal effects.65 That rule will not be found in
a theory of language. Theories of language provide at most menus of
possible meanings, not reasons for picking one or another. The rule that
determines which meaning is legally relevant is, rather, a rule of
construction. It is a rule that determines how parties’ words and actions will
affect their legal obligations. Consequently, although the activity of
interpretation commonly comes first in the process of exegesis—or as
Corbin puts it, “A ‘meaning’ must be given to the words before determining
their legal operation”66—rules of construction enjoy a certain conceptual
priority. One cannot know what type of meaning to seek out—what rule of
65

Cass Sunstein and Richard Fallon have each recently suggested that
public law texts can have multiple meanings, paralleling my observation
about contractual agreements. Cass Sunstein, There Is Nothing that
Interpretation Just Is, 30 Const. Comment. 193, 193 (2015) (“there is
nothing that interpretation ‘just is,’” and “no approach to constitutional
interpretation is mandatory”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal
“Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1235, 1239 (2015) (there is a “diversity of senses of meaning
that constitute . . . potential ‘referents’ for claims of legal meaning”).
Neither however, suggests a simple rule for choosing amongst them.
Sunstein recommends an outcome-based approach the choice among
interpretive methods in constitutional law. “Among the reasonable
alternatives, any particular approach to the Constitution must be defended
on the ground that it makes the relevant constitutional order better rather
than worse.” 30 Const. Comment. at 212. To date Sunstein he has not made
an outcome-based case for one or another form of constitutional
interpretation. Fallon argues that it is a mistake to equate statutory or
constitutional meaning with any one type of meaning. Rather than selecting
a single mode of interpretation on the basis of overall outcomes, Fallon
recommends “a relatively case-by-case approach to selecting” the
appropriate sort of meaning. 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1303.
66
Corbin (1st edition) § 534, 8.
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interpretation to apply—without first knowing the applicable rule of
construction.
Here we see a further advantage of the complementary conception
of the interpretation-construction distinction. Leiber’s supplemental
conception, which treats construction as necessary only when
interpretation runs out, cannot explain how the law chooses amongst
different meanings. The problem is not obvious in the context of Lieber’s
own theory. Although Lieber distinguishes different approaches to
interpretation, he rejects the idea that a legal text might have more than one
meaning.67 Thus when an authoritative text’s one true sense is discernible, it
decides the issue.
Lieber’s supplemental conception falls apart if a text does not have
only one true sense—if “meaning” is ambiguous. Once one abandons
simple theories of meaning, it is obvious that the law requires a rule for
choosing among the meanings a single speech act might have. That rule
will not be a rule of interpretation, but a rule of construction. The diversity
of meanings therefore provides a further argument for the complementary
conception of interpretation and construction.
The point is not merely about the advantages of one or another
conception of the interpretation-construction distinction. The conceptual
priority of construction reflects an important fact about the sorts of
arguments needed to justify legal rules of interpretation. Consider Justice
Traynor’s argument in Pacific Gas, quoting from Corbin, for interpreting
written agreements in light of the surrounding circumstances:
Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents. . . .
The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the
“verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in
view of the linguistic education and experience of their users and
their hearers or readers (not excluding judges). . . . A word has no
meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an
objective meaning, one true meaning.”68
Such appeals to the theory of meaning are relatively common amongst antitextualist contract theorists. Melvin Eisenberg argues, “The proper
interpretation of all purposive expressions, including contractual
expressions, is necessarily dynamic, because the meaning of a purposive
67

Whereas theologians might distinguish between the Bible’s “typical,
allegorical, parabolical, anagogical, moral and accommodatory senses, and
of corresponding modes of interpretation, . . . [i]n politics and law we have
to deal with plain words and human use of them only.” Lieber, Legal and
Political Hermeneutics at 76.
68
442 P.2d at 644-45 (quoting Arthur Linton Corbin, The Interpretation of
Words and the Parol Evidence Rule 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)).
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expression is always determined in part by its context, and the context is
prior to the expression.”69 E. Allen Farnsworth maintains, “The very concept
of plain meaning finds scant support in semantics, where one of the
cardinal teachings is the fallibility of language as a means of
communication.”70 The comments to section 212 of the Second
Restatement assert that “meaning can almost never be plain except in a
context.”71 And the comments to section 2-202 of the UCC provide, “This
section definitively rejects . . . [t]he premise that the language used has the
meaning attributable to such language by rules of construction existing in
the law rather than the meaning which arises out of the commercial context
in which it was used.”72
These appeals to the theory of language are flawed. It might well be
that parties in fact understand one another in light of the context, their
purpose and their linguistic experience. It is not, however, a given that the
parties’ contractual obligation should track those understandings, or that
legal interpretation should mirror the parties’ interpretive practices. The
contextually enriched pragmatic meaning that often anchors the parties’
understanding of their agreement is not the only meaning the law might
look to, and might not even be the meaning that the parties themselves, if
they thought about it, would want to control.73 Deciding which meaning
should govern requires considering more than the theory of language. With
respect to contractual interpretation, relevant considerations include:
(a) costs of drafting; (b) costs of litigation; (c) the ability of third-party
enforcers to accurately identify one or another type of meaning;
69

Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, in 2
Theoretical Inq. L. 1, 27 (2001).
70
E. Allen Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939,
952 (1967). See also E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.10, 454 (4th ed.
2004) (“Indeed, it is questionable whether a word has meaning at all when
divorced from the circumstances in which it is used.”).
71
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b. Cf. 3 Corbin (1st edition)
§ 542, 100-02 (“[S]ome of the surrounding circumstances always must be
known before the meaning of the words can be plain and clear.”). A similar
claim can be found in the comments to section 214 of the Second
Restatement:
Words, written or oral, cannot apply themselves to the subject
matter. . . . Even though words seem on their face to have only a
single possible meaning, other meanings often appear when the
circumstances are disclosed.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214, cmt. b.
72
U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1.
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The latter point is argued at length in Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13,
and Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023 (2009).
22

Contracts and Constitutions
(d) predictability of outcomes; (e) how responsive parties are to the
incentives legal interpretive rules generate, and especially whether they are
likely to draft their agreements to take account of those rules; (f) relational
costs, both of putting everything into an agreement and of interpretive rules
that give legal effect to behavior outside of a writing; (g) parties’ expressed
or probable preference with respect to how their agreement is interpreted;
and (h) more generally, society’s reasons for attaching legal consequences
to exchange agreements.74 Other factors will be relevant in other areas of
the law. But in all instances, the reasons for picking one or another
meaning will be found in political and legal principles, policies and
practicalities, not in the theory of language. The choice requires a rule of
construction, and rules of construction are creatures of law.
2.4

When one type of interpretation runs out, another type might step in

On the supplemental conception, when interpretation fails to
attribute to the text a legally effective meaning, noninterpretive rules of
construction step in. Perhaps something like this idea lies behind Randy
Barnett’s suggestion that “[w]hen original meaning runs out, constitutional
‘interpretation,’ strictly speaking, is over, and some new noninterpretive
activity must supplement the information revealed by interpretation.”75 But
if there are multiple types of meaning, and therefore multiple approaches to
interpretation, a rule of construction might specify that when one type of
interpretation runs out, another type steps in.
In fact this is how contract law often proceeds. I have already
mentioned two examples. Courts that adopt a textualist approach to written
agreements regularly consider extratextual facts to resolve textual
ambiguities. When textualist interpretation runs out, another interpretive
rule steps in. And the Restatement provides that when interpretation of
subjective meaning does not produce a single result, objective meaning
controls. If the parties’ subjective understandings of their word and actions
agree, that meaning governs; if their subjective understandings conflict,
their legal obligations are determined by the objective meaning of their
words and actions.
The existence of rules of construction that specify more than one
type of meaning entails that is doubly wrong to divide the activity of
74

For other lists of relevant factors, see Katz, Avery Weiner Katz, The
Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum. L.
Rev. 496, 522-36 (2004); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain
Meaning Rule, and The Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 533, 543-47 (1998).
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Randy Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 Fordham L.
Rev. 411, 419 (2013). Or Barnett’s claim might rest on a substantive
commitment, e.g., to originalism.
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exegesis into two distinct stages: first interpretation and second
construction. Not only do the correct rules of interpretation depend on the
relevant rule of construction—what I have called the conceptual priority of
construction—but a rule of construction might specify multiple stages of
interpretation.
3

Interpretation and Construction in Constitutional Law: Joseph Story
and Thomas Cooley

I believe the above claims about the nature of and relationship
between interpretation and construction are true of legal exegesis generally.
Identifying the effect of any legal text or other speech act requires knowing
more than its meaning. Any legal speech act might be subjected to different
types of interpretation, to which correspond various types of meaning. The
choice among meanings cannot be resolved by the theory of language, but
always involves considerations of principle, policy and practicality. And the
existence of multiple types of meaning generally entails that when one type
of interpretation runs out, another might step in.
Depending on one’s tastes, it would be either very interesting or
very tedious to explore how those claims apply across the entire range of
legal exegesis. That is not the project of this Article. But the topic of the
2018 Salmon P. Chase Faculty Colloquium provides an opportunity to
illustrate the value of the above analysis for understanding two nineteenthcentury approaches to constitutional interpretation. The remainder of this
Article argues that the above theory of interpretation and construction
provides a useful framework for understanding Thomas Cooley’s and Joseph
Story’s accounts of constitutional interpretation.
Cooley’s 1868 A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations which rests
on the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union is largely a
discussion of state constitutions.76 Cooley’s treatise nonetheless draws
heavily on Story’s 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States.77 Although Cooley briefly mentions the interpretation-construction
distinction at the outset of his chapter on constitutional interpretation,
neither he nor Story incorporates it into his theory of constitutional
exegesis.78 Nonetheless, distinguishing the two activities and the types of
76

Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which
rests on the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (1868)
(hereinafter “Cooley (1st edition)”).
77
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
(1833) (hereinafter “Story (1st edition)”). After the publication of his
Treatise, Cooley served as editor of the 1873 fourth edition of Story’s
Commentaries.
78
At the outset of the chapter “Of the Construction of State Constitutions” in
the first edition of his treatise, Cooley briefly discusses Lieber’s distinction
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rules that govern each provides critical insight into Cooley and Story’s
shared approach to constitutional exegesis. More specifically, each of the
four structural features identified in Part Two—the complementarity of
interpretation and construction, the multiple meanings of “meaning,” the
conceptual priority of rules of construction, and the fact that when one type
of interpretation runs out, another can step in—appears in both Story’s and
Cooley’s theories.
The starting point for understanding Story’s and Cooley’s accounts
of constitutional exegesis is their shared answer to the “whose meaning”
question. Each in the course of his analysis recognizes at least three
possible answers. The legally relevant meaning of the constitutional text
might be the meaning it had for those who drafted the documents—
participants in the Philadelphia Convention or state analogs. This is a form
of author meaning that I will call “framer meaning.” Where a constitution
was ratified by an elected body, as the U.S. Constitution was by state
conventions called specially for that purpose, the relevant meaning might
be the understandings of members of the ratifying bodies. Call this “ratifier
meaning.” Finally, the relevant meaning might be the meaning the text had
at the time of ratification for the public at large, or its “public meaning.”
How Story and Cooley go about picking among these meanings illustrates
the conceptual priority of construction. Their arguments for public meaning
can be broken down into two parts.
between interpretation and construction. Cooley (1st edition) at 33, n. 1;
see also Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
which rests on the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union
40-41 (2d ed. 1871). But Cooley does not distinguish between the two
activities in his account of constitutional exegesis. In the 1871 second
edition, Cooley explains that “[i]n common use, however, the word
construction is generally employed in the law in a sense embracing all that
is properly covered by both when used in a sense strictly and technically
correct; and we shall so employ it in the present chapter.” Id. at 41. The
first edition of Story’s Commentaries was published six years before Lieber
published his book on the interpretation-construction distinction. Story
neither anticipates the distinction in the first edition nor incorporates it into
later editions.
Theodore Sedgwick is perhaps the nineteenth century treatise writer
who follows Lieber most closely, though Sedgwick writes that he does not
consider the interpretation-construction distinction “of much value for the
student of jurisprudence.” Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules
which Govern the Interpretation and Application of Statutory and
Constitutional Law 227 (1857). The structure of Sedgwick’s discussion of
statutory interpretation follows Lieber’s distinction: Chapter Six provides
rules of interpretation aimed at discerning legislative intent; Chapter Seven
discusses how judges should decide cases when interpretation runs out.
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The first is the thesis, shared with Lieber, that the goal of legal
interpretation is to discover the sovereign lawgiver’s intent. Story puts the
point as follows: “The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all
instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms, and the
intention of the parties.”79 Or Cooley: “In the case of all written laws, it is
the intent of the lawgiver that is to be enforced.”80 As in Lieber, this thesis
suggests a command theory of law. Because law is the command of the
sovereign, legal interpretation should seek to discover that sovereign’s
intent.
It follows that the answer to the “whose meaning” question cannot
be framer meaning. The framers of the state and federal constitutions did
not authorize the constitutional texts; they merely authored them.
Consequently, constitutional interpretation should not give any special
weight to the proceedings at drafting conventions or to framers’
understandings of the resulting texts. Cooley’s explanation of the difference
between a constitution and ordinary legislation nicely illustrates the
importance of the distinction between author and authorizer.
For as the constitution does not derive its force from the convention
which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be
arrived at is that of the people. . . . These proceedings therefore are
less conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are
legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since
in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in
the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people
through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.81
In ordinary legislation author and authorizer at least overlap. The legislative
text is typically authored by a committee of legislators, sometimes amended
by the legislature as a whole, and then authorized by the legislature as a
whole.82 A constitution, in distinction, is more akin to a standard form
contract: the author is not the authorizer. And according to the command
79

Story (1st edition) at 383.
Cooley (1st edition) at 55.
81
Cooley (1st edition) at 66-67. See also Story at 392 n.1 (making a similar
point in response to Jefferson’s suggestion that constitutional interpretation
look to the records of the Philadelphia and ratifying conventions: “The
people adopted the constitution according to the words of the text in their
reasonable interpretation, and not according to the private interpretation of
any particular men. The opinions of the latter may sometimes aid us in
arriving at just results; but they can never be conclusive.”).
82
For an account of how it is we can assign collective intentions, including
collective communicative intentions, to legislative bodies, see Victoria
Nourse, Misreading Law, Misreading Democracy (2016).
80
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theory, it is only the intent of the latter that matters. Framer meaning is
rejected on the basis of a political claim about whose meaning matters: that
of the sovereign who authorizes the constitution.
The second component of Story and Cooley’s answer to the “whose
meaning” question is their shared position that in the United States the
people are sovereign, and that a constitution’s legal authority, whether state
or federal, derives from its authorization by the people. Story opens his
Chapter Five account of constitutional interpretation with an extended
discussion.
In our future commentaries upon the constitution we shall treat it,
then, as it is denominated in the instrument itself, as a CONSTITUTION
of government, ordained and established by the people of the
United States for themselves and their posterity. They have declared
it the supreme law of the land. They have made it a limited
government. They have defined its authority. They have restrained it
to the exercise of certain powers, and reserved all others to the
states or to the people. It is a popular government. Those who
administer it are responsible to the people. It is as popular, and just
as much emanating from the people, as the state governments. It is
created for one purpose; the state governments for another. It may
be altered, and amended, and abolished at the will of the people. In
short, it was made by the people, made for the people, and is
responsible to the people.83
Cooley articulates a similar view of both the national constitution and state
constitutions.
The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is
in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority. They
have created a national Constitution, and conferred upon it powers
of sovereignty over certain subjects, and they create State
governments upon which they confer the remaining powers of
sovereignty, so far as they are disposed to allow them to be
exercised at all.84
83

Story (1st edition) at 382 (footnote omitted).
Cooley (1st edition) at 28 (footnote omitted).
Cooley was less a theorist than was Story. The above passage is
supported not by an argument, but by a citation to Justice McLean’s
opinion, riding circuit, in Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean 337, 347
(1838). Id. at 28 n. 3. And whereas Story speaks from within the theory of
popular sovereignty, Cooley speaks as if he is reporting it the theory of the
U.S. political system—from the perspective of an observer rather than
participant. Thus the above passage is followed by a discussion of the
84
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It follows that the meaning that matters for constitutional interpretation is
not ratifier meaning, but the text’s public meaning. If the goal of legal
interpretation is to get at the intent of the sovereign who authorized the
legal text (the first component of the argument), and if constitutions are
authorized by the sovereign people (the second component), then the
proper aim of constitutional interpretation is to identify the public meaning
of the constitutional text. “[T]he real question is what the people meant.” 85
To the reader not steeped in the early nineteenth century
constitutional debates, this appeal to popular sovereignty might read like a
bland invocation of the Lockean contractualist tradition. But Story’s
popular-sovereignty theory of the U.S. Constitution was taking sides in one
of the more contentious political-theoretical debates of the time.86 The
division was between those who viewed the Constitution as a compact
between the states, or between the people of the several states, and those
who viewed it as authorized by the people of the United States a whole.87
For my purposes, a few examples of the compact view suffice to identify the
highly political quality of Story’s theory of national popular sovereignty.
Richard Tuck has observed that at the time of the founding there
was widespread agreement that the U.S. Constitution required ratification
not by state legislatures, as the Articles of Confederation had been, but by
specially constituted assemblies.88 Circumventing state legislatures,
however, did not preclude a view of the Constitution as a compact among
the several states. Tuck takes George Mason’s views as exemplary.
It should be noted (since the issue became hugely important in the
latter interpretation of the Constitution) that at least in Mason’s eyes
an appeal to the people over the heads of the legislatures was
limited franchise, in which Cooley makes clear that he is merely reporting
the judgment of the polity as to who should have the franchise, not treating
that judgment as justified. “What should be the correct rule on this subject,
it does not fall within our province to consider.” Id. at 29. For a more
ambitious post-Civil War argument for a national popular-sovereignty
theory, see John Alexander Jameson, The Constitutional Convention: Its
History, Powers, and Modes of Proceeding 17-65 (1867).
85
Cooley (1st edition) at 61.
86
Cooley’s adoption of a similar position on state constitutions was less
controversial. See Richard Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of
Modern Democracy 191-97 (2016) (describing the use of plebiscites to
ratify state constitutions in the period between 1778 and the beginning of
the Civil War).
87
Richard Tuck provides a good overview of how that divide played out
over time. Id. at 181-242.
88
Id. at 206-07.
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compatible with the separate identity of those people in their
respective states; it was possible to believe in the necessity of a
democratic process within each state as the guarantee of the federal
Constitution’s legitimacy, without believing that the people had
created a new and unitary nation.89
The compact-theory of the Constitution found application in the 1798 and
1799 Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, which purported to adjudge
unconstitutional the federal Alien and Sedition Acts. Each maintained that
because the Constitution was a compact between the states, the states had
the power to determine violations of it.90 In his 1803 edition of Blackstone’s
Commentaries, George Tucker gave a systematic account of the theory. The
Constitution was for Tucker “a compact freely, voluntarily and solemnly
entered into by the several states, and ratified by the people thereof,

89

Id. at 207. Tuck reads Madison as articulating a similar argument in
Federalist 39, though Federalist 39 maintained that the Constitution would
also have a national character. For example:
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are
understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so
many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is
obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither
from the decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor from
that of a majority of the States.
George w. Carey & James McClellan (eds.), The Federalist 197 (2001).
90
The Virginia Resolution provided:
[T]his Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it
views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the
compact, to which the states are parties; . . . and that in case of a
deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not
granted by the said compact, the states who are parties thereto, have
the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the
progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective
limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.
Virginia Resolutions of 1798 in Jonathan Elliot, ed., 4 Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as
Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 554,
554 (2nd ed., 1888). The Kentucky Resolutions similarly provided that “the
several states who formed [the federal Constitution], being sovereign and
independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction; and
that a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done
under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy.” Kentucky
Resolutions of 1799, id. at 566, 571.
29

Contracts and Constitutions
respectively.”91 Tucker drew from this a rule of construction: The powers of
the federal government were only those expressly innumerate in the
constitution,
for, expressum facit taccre tacituni is a maxim in all cases of
construction: it is likewise a maxim of political law, that sovereign
states cannot be deprived of any of their rights by implication; nor
in any manner whatever but by their own voluntary consent, or by
submission to a conqueror.92
Citing Tucker and others, H. Jefferson Powell has argued that in the first
decade of the nineteenth century, “the constitutional theory of the Virginia
and Kentucky resolutions established itself as American political
orthodoxy,” an orthodoxy that “stood virtually unquestioned until the
nullification crisis of 1828 through 1832.”93
Whether or not the compact theory ever attained the status of
orthodoxy,94 there is no doubt but that in his 1833 Commentaries Story set
out to refute it, and to give an alternative account of the authorization and
authority of the US Constitution. Chapter Three of the Commentaries, titled
“Nature of the Constitution—Whether a Compact,” provides a detailed
criticism of Tucker’s theory.95 Story’s arguments range from high political
theory to a close reading of the constitutional text. Interesting though the
details are, the important point for my purposes is that they all sound in the
register of jurisprudence, political theory, history and textual analysis. The
Chapter provides a jurisprudential theory of the Constitution, which in turn
provides the basis for Story’s answer in Chapter Five to the “whose
91

1 Blackstone’s Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, to the
Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and
of the Commonwealth of Virginia 155 (St. George Tucker ed. 1803). See
also id. at 148 (“It is a federal compact; several sovereign and independent
states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without
each ceasing to be a perfect state.”) & 169 (“It is a compact by which the
several states and the people thereof, respectively, have bound themselves
to each other, and to the federal government.”).
92
Tucker at 143.
93
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 885, 934, 935 (1985). See also H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph
Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated Review, 94 Yale L.J.
1285, 1302 (1985) (describing the constitutional argument behind the
South Carolina Exposition of 1828).
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For a critical assessment of Powell’s use of original sources, see Charles
A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const. Comm.
77 (1988).
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Story (1st edition) at 279-343.
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meaning” question.96 Because it was the people as a whole authorized the
Constitution, it is their understanding of the document that matters, and not
that of the participants at state ratifying conventions. The answer is not
given by the theory of language, but by a rule of construction that, on the
basis of legal and political considerations, determines which meaning
matters. This is the conceptual priority of construction.
Story’s arguments about the nature of sovereignty in the United
States can appear quaint to a modern, realist eye—akin to arguments about
the actual location a business incorporated in one state with agents in
another.97 But the “whose meaning” question has hardly disappeared from
constitutional theory. It lies, for example, at the bottom of the disagreement
between original-intent originalists and original-meaning originalists.
Original-intent originalism recommends interpretation of the framers’ intent
or purpose when they drafted the constitutional text. Original-meaning
originalism recommends interpretation of how, at the time of drafting,
ordinary citizens would have understood the constitutional text. The
disagreement is in one sense about what constitutional interpretation
should look like. But it cannot be answered by the theory of meaning alone.
Neither side denies that one might interpret the constitution as the other
side advocates. The question is which type of meaning should make a legal
difference. That is a question not of interpretation, but of construction. Its
answer will be found not in the theory of language, but in political
principles, policy priorities and practical considerations.98
In Section 2.2 I distinguished three categories of questions regarding
the various meanings a legal speech act can have: Whose meaning matters?
What type of meaning matters? And what facts go into the determination of
the meaning that matters? And I observed that, though the questions are
analytically distinct, their answers are often practically connected. The
answer to one of the questions often informs answers to the others.
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Story was also an advocate, and marshaled more than one argument for
his answer to the whose meaning question. Thus he also observed the
diversity of opinion at the ratifying conventions provide neither the
certainty nor the uniformity necessary for a foundational document. Story
(1st edition) at 388-89. This is an argument that relies on practical legal
considerations, rather than political principle. It too, however, extends
beyond the theory of meaning.
97
The example, of course, is from Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 809-12 (1935).
98
Jack Balkin makes a similar point with respect to constitutional history
generally: “[I]n constitutional construction, history is a resource, not a
command. . . . [H]ow history is used and how it becomes relevant depends
on each modality’s underlying theory of justification.” Balkin, supra note 2
at 652.
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This dynamic too can be seen in both Cooley and Story. Their
answers to the “whose meaning” question—public meaning—informs other
aspects of their theories of constitutional interpretation. We can start with a
choice among various conventional, or semantic, meanings a constitutional
text can have. Both Story and Cooley recognize that a single word in a
constitution might have multiple conventional meanings. Where contract
law emphasizes the difference between popular meanings and usages of
trade, Story and Cooley discuss that between popular meanings and
technical legal meanings. Both maintain that legal terms of art, such as
“habeas corpus,” must be read in their technical senses. But, they argue,
ordinary words in a constitution should be read in accordance with their
popular meanings.99 Cooley explains: “Narrow and technical reasoning is
misplaced when it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the
people themselves, for themselves, and designed as a chart upon which
every man, learned and unlearned, may be able to trace the leading
principles of government.”100 Or as Story puts the point:
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties,
for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades
of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness, or
judicial research. . . . The people make them; the people adopt
them; the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of
common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any
recondite meaning, or any extraordinary gloss.101
The choice among semantic meanings turns on Story and Cooley’s answer
to the “whose meaning” question. In contract law, the relevance of the
parties’ understanding (whose meaning) suggests taking account of relevant
usages of trade (what type of meaning); in Story’s and Cooley’s
constitutional theories, the relevance of the people’s understanding (whose
meaning) suggests attending to the text’s popular meaning rather than any
technical legal meaning it might have (what type of meaning).
Another distinction among types of meaning is that between a text’s
semantic and its pragmatic meanings. Although Story did not have the
technical tools to draw it, he recognizes something like the distinction. At
the outset of his chapter on constitutional interpretation, Story catalogues
various types of interpretation identified by other theorists. One is Thomas
99

Cooley (1st edition) at 58 (“In interpreting clauses we must presume that
words have been employed in their natural and ordinary meaning.”); Story
(1st edition) at 436 (“[E]very word employed in the constitution is to be
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context
furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.”).
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Cooley (1st edition) at 59.
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Story (1st edition) at 436-37.
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Rutherforth’s differentiation, in his lectures on Grotius, between “literal”
and “rational” interpretation.
The first [literal interpretation] is, where we collect the intention of
the party from his words only, as they lie before us. The second
[rational interpretation] is, where his words do not express that
intention perfectly, but exceed it, or fall short of it, and we are to
collect it from probable or rational conjectures only.102
Story relates Rutherforth’s categories to one understanding of the difference
between “strict” and “large” interpretation.
[A]s, on the one hand, we call it a strict interpretation, where we
contend, that the letter is to be adhered to precisely; so, on the other
hand, we call it a large interpretation, where we contend, that the
words ought to be taken in such a sense, as common usage will not
fully justify; or that the meaning of the legislator is something
different from what his words in any usage would import. In this
sense a large interpretation is synonymous with what has before
been called a rational interpretation.103
Story maintains that constitutional interpretation should be, in these senses,
rational and large.
Again Story’s argument lies in his answer to the “whose meaning”
question, and in the political theories that together support it—the
command and popular-sovereignty theories. Because the goal of
constitutional interpretation is to get at the probable intentions of the
populace that authorized the document, the constitutional text must be
interpreted as a whole according to its apparent purpose. “The words are
not, indeed, to be stretched beyond their fair sense; but within that range,
the rule of interpretation must be taken, which best follows out the apparent
intention.”104 In contemporary parlance, although semantic meaning no
102

Story (1st edition) at 385. See 2 T. Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law;
Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius de Jure Belli et
Pacis, Read in St. John's College, Cambridge 407-08 (1832). (“Where we
collect the intention of the speaker or the writer from his words only, as
they lie before us, this is literal interpretation. Where his words do not
express his intention perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that
we are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only, this is
rational interpretation.”).
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Story (1st edition) at 386.
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Story (1st edition) at 397. See also id. at 406 (“But a constitution of
government, founded by the people for themselves and their posterity, and
for objects of the most momentous nature, for perpetual union, for the
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doubt matters, the ultimate goal is to get at a constitution’s pragmatic
meaning.
Unlike Story, Cooley does not employ the distinctions between
literal and rational, or large and narrow, interpretation. But he draws the
connection between popular authorization and the intent behind the
constitutional text even more closely.
Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which,
standing by itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be made
plain by comparison with other clauses or portions of the same law.
It is therefore a rule of construction, that the whole is to be
examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of each part.105
The ultimate goal of constitutional interpretation is not the document’s
literal meaning, but its intended one. When the text’s semantic and
pragmatic meanings conflict, literal meaning give’s way to the apparent
intended meaning of its words.
The final question I identified under the “what type of meaning”
heading concerns what facts go into the determination of a text or other
speech act’s meaning. Story and Cooley’s emphasis on purpose does not
preclude a shared adherence to textualism. Both give primacy to the
constitutional text. Although the goal is to get at the sovereign people’s
intent, as Cooley puts it, “this intent is to be found in the instrument itself. It
is to be presumed that language has been employed with sufficient
precision to convey it, and unless examination demonstrates that the
presumption does not hold good in the particular case, nothing will remain
except to enforce it.”106 Textualism of this sort was common in nineteenth
century jurisprudence. But Story expressly ties his constitutional textualism
to the theory of popular sovereignty. The Constitution’s plain meaning
governs because “[n]othing but the text itself was adopted by the
people.”107
establishment of justice, for the general welfare, and for a perpetuation of
the blessings of liberty, necessarily requires, that every interpretation of its
powers should have a constant reference to these objects.”)
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Cooley (1st edition) at 57.
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Cooley (1st edition) at 55.
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Story (1st edition) at 389. See also id. at 392 n.1 (“The people adopted
the constitution according to the words of the text in their reasonable
interpretation, and not according to the private interpretation of any
particular men.”). Compare 2 Williston (1st edition) § 606, 1165 (“Where
[the parties] incorporate their agreement into a writing they have attempted
more than to assent by means of symbols to certain things, they have
assented to the writing as the adequate expression of the things to which
they agree.”).
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Story’s and Cooley’s answers to the “what facts” question, however,
is not the legal analog of sola scriptura. I have suggested that the existence
of multiple meanings entails that when one form of interpretation runs out,
another might step in. Story and Cooley’s answer to the “what facts”
question illustrates just that. When the constitutional text alone does not
answer a legal question, the interpreter should look to extrinsic evidence of
its meaning. Thus Cooley writes, “It is possible . . . that after we shall have
made use of all the lights which the instrument itself affords, there may still
be doubts to clear up and ambiguities to explain. Then, and only then, are
we warranted in seeking elsewhere for aid.”108 Similarly, Story argues that
“contemporary construction” of the text may be used “to illustrate, and
confirm the text, to explain a doubtful phrase, or to expound an obscure
clause.”109 In short, when the constitutional text’s plain meaning does not
resolve a legal question, interpretation may take into account evidence
from beyond the text. When one form of interpretation runs out, another
can step in.
The above discussion does not cover everything that Cooley and
Story have to say about constitutional interpretation. Nor does everything
they say tie back to my analysis of interpretation and construction. But
many of the core arguments do. Both Story and Cooley ground large
portions of their theories of constitutional interpretation not on a theory of
meaning, but on a political theory of constitutions: a command theory of
law together with a commitment to popular sovereignty. They use that
political theory to develop a theory of constitutional construction that
identifies as legally relevant the text’s public meaning, as distinguished from
the framers’ authorial understanding or the meaning ratifiers might have
attached to the text; that prioritizes nontechnical over technical meanings;
that looks to pragmatic rather than semantic meaning; that gives priority to
textual interpretation; and that allows for extrinsic evidence of meaning
when textual interpretation runs out. These arguments nicely illustrate the
complementary conception of interpretation and construction, the
multiplicity of meanings, the conceptual priority of construction, and the
fact that when one form of interpretation runs out, another can step in.
4

The Fixation Thesis

Before ending, I want to consider one more passage from Cooley’s
Treatise that further confirms the value of the above account of
interpretation and construction. Early in his chapter on constitutional
interpretation, Cooley advances a claim strikingly similar what Solum calls
“the fixation thesis.” Solum puts that thesis as follows: “The object of
constitutional interpretation is the communicative content of the
108
109
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constitutional text, and that content was fixed when each provision was
framed and/or ratified.”110 Along the same lines, Cooley writes: “The
meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not
different at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon
it.”111
Taken out of context, one might read Cooley’s version in either of
two ways. On the first, it belongs to the theory of language. The meaning of
a speech act is a fact about it that does not change over time. On the
second, it belongs to political theory. The purpose of a constitution is better
served by attributing it a meaning that does not change over time.
Solum’s case for his fixation thesis suggests that he understands it in
the first sense. Solum argues that the communicative content of a speech
act depends on two facts: the conventional semantic meaning of the words
in it and relevant aspects of the context that enrich its semantic content.112
Both are facts about the world at the time the speech act is produced.
Because the facts that go into determining a speech act’s communicative
content are “time-bound,” so too is that meaning. Solum’s fixation thesis is
therefore a claim not about law, but about communicative content. “The
core of the affirmative case for the Fixation Thesis is rooted in common
sense intuitions about the meaning of old texts.”113
Although Solum’s conception of communicative content is
relatively catholic, in the sense that it can accommodate different versions
of originalism,114 it describes only one category of meanings the
constitutional text might have. Solum considers whether pluralism about
meanings provides an objection to the fixation thesis.115 He takes Mark
Greenberg’s work as an example, and argues that the three types of
meaning Greenberg identifies—framer meaning, ratifier meaning and literal
clause meaning—“all . . . are fixed, albeit at slightly different times.”116 But
of course those are only the three types of meaning Greenberg happens to
identify. With respect to the idea that there might be “other unfixed
meanings” of the constitutional text, such as “the meaning that is
normatively reasonable given contemporary circumstances and values,”
Solum offers two answers. First, he observes that reasonable contemporary
110
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meaning “is not a plausible meaning of the authoritative token of the
constitutional text.”117 I take this to be a restatement of Solum’s commitment
to originalism, which is just a commitment to the thesis that the words in
the constitution should be given the meaning they “had in the original
expression token.”118 As Solum himself recognizes, this is not the only
possible approach to the constitutional text. The Supreme Court often treats
its words as types, finding their meaning in post-ratification acts of judicial
interpretation and contemporary .119 The meaning of the Constitution as
token is not the only meaning of the text. Solum’s second answer is that
“[t]he communicative content of the original Constitution, written in 1787,
cannot be plausibly viewed as identical to the content that would be
reasonable to day.”120 This answer assumes that the goal of constitutional
interpretation should be to identify the text’s communicative content. Like
the token argument, it too assumes we already know Which of meaning is
legally relevant. But the multiple-meanings objection is that we need an
argument for claims about what type of meaning matters. Solum’s fixation
thesis is a claim about one type of meaning, not an argument that that type
should govern.
In distinction to Solum’s linguistic argument for the fixation thesis,
Cooley’s argument is a functional one. It turns not on the nature of
language but on what we want a written constitution to do.
A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and
another at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have
so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem
desirable. A principal share of the benefit expected from written
constitutions would be lost if the rules they established were so
flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public
opinion. It is with special reference to the varying moods of public
opinion, and with a view to putting the fundamentals of government
beyond their control, that these instruments are framed; and there
can be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as
inheres in the principles of the common law.121
Cooley’s version of the fixation thesis is based not on “common sense
intuitions about the meaning of old texts,” but on what constitutional
interpretation must look like if the polity is to secure the benefits of a
written constitution. His is an argument not about language, but about the
law: it is desirable that the meaning of a written constitution not change
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over time. Although this is a claim about what constitutional interpretation
should look like, it is at bottom about the best rule of constitutional
construction. It addresses not what a constitution means, but which of its
meanings should matter when determining its legal effect.
The point of the above is not to argue that one or another version of
the fixation thesis is better, but to illustrate the value of distinguishing
between interpretation and construction along the lines I have suggested.
Each version of the fixation thesis is incomplete in its own way. Solum’s
linguistic argument, if successful, shows only that if the Constitution’s
original communicative content is its legally relevant meaning, then that
meaning is fixed. The argument does not demonstrate the truth of the
antecedent—that the Constitution’s original communicative content should
be the legally relevant meaning. In Solum’s theoretical framework, that is
the job of a separate Constraint Principle.122 Cooley’s argument, if
successful, identifies a desideratum for any legally relevant meaning: that it
be fixed. It too does not in itself tell us which meaning is relevant, as more
than one might be fixed at the time of ratification. Unlike Solum’s
argument, however, Cooley’s operates at the level on which questions of
constitutional interpretive theory must ultimately be answered. This is the
level of rules of construction, which in the law are conceptually prior to
rules of interpretation.
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